The  Right to Be Left Alone: Integration of the Four Publication-Based Tort Actions by Moore, Schuyler M.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1994
The Right to Be Left Alone: Integration of the Four
Publication-Based Tort Actions
Schuyler M. Moore
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schuyler M. Moore, The Right to Be Left Alone: Integration of the Four Publication-Based Tort Actions, 14 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 405
(1994).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol14/iss3/1
THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE:
INTEGRATION OF THE FOUR
PUBLICATION-BASED TORT ACTIONS
Schuyler M. Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 405
II. THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIONS ...................... 407
III. THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE ACTIONS .............. 409
IV. THE UNIFIED NATURE OF THE ACTIONS ............... 410
A. Offensive .................................. 410
1. Presumed If Commercial Use .............. 411
2. Rebutting the Presumption ................ 411
B. Publication ................................. 414
C. Regarding the Plaintiff ......................... 414
V. DEFENSES .................................... 414
A. First Amendment ............................. 415
1. Matters of Public Interest ................. 415
2. Parodies ............................. 417
B. Express or Implied Consent ..................... 417
C. Truthful Publication of Public Facts or Opinion ....... 418
D. Privileged ................................. 418
*Schuyler M. Moore is a Partner in the Corporate Entertainment Group of Stroock & Stroock
& Lavan, Los Angeles, California.
406 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
VI. NON-DEFENSES ................................. 419
A. Copyright Act Preemption ...................... 419
B. Disclaimers ................................. 420
C. Fair Use .................................. 420
VII. EXAMPLEs .................................... 420
VIII. CONCLUSION .................................. 424
I. INTRODUCTION
This article was born of the author's alarm regarding the expanding
definition of the right of publicity, a right which has escaped all reasonable
boundaries, posing a threat to the First Amendment and the free market-
place of ideas. Most of the damage has been caused by federal courts,
particularly the Ninth Circuit, which purport to apply state law. For
example, a 1992 Ninth Circuit case held that a Samsung Electronics
advertisement, in which a robot in an evening gown spun the "Wheel of
Fortune," violated Vanna White's right of publicity.' An inquiry into the
right of publicity requires a retracing of its historical progression back to
its roots,--the right to privacy-and leads to the study of two siblings of
the right of publicity: (1) false light in the public eye and (2) public
disclosure of private facts. Both are privacy actions that, like the right of
publicity, are based on publication.2
The first draft of this article dealt solely with the right of publicity.
Upon the realization that it was impossible to make any coherent recom-
mendations with respect to the right of publicity without considering the
impact on all three publication-based privacy actions, this article grew
accordingly. Later, it also became evident that the article integrate
defamation (both slander and libel) into the analysis, since defamation
implicated equivalent rights and is also based on publication. During this
evolutionary process, it became the author's conviction, and the thesis of
this article, that the four publication-based tort actions should be integrated
into one cause of action based on the same prima facie case and defenses.
The publication-based tort actions are currently splintered through an
1. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 2443
(1993).
2. A third sibling, invasion of privacy, is not based on publication and is not discussed in this
article.
PUBUCATION BASED TORTS
historical anomaly of different phrasing of the same issue in different cases.
It is as though a battery caused by a punch to the stomach and a battery
caused by a punch to the face are separate causes of action simply because
of the different words used to describe each punch.
This article sets forth a unified framework of analysis that integrates
the four publication-based tort actions. The author's hope is that applica-
tion of this analysis will lead to a uniform and consistent body of law and,
more importantly, to the courts' recognition and application of uniform
defenses necessary to protect the First Amendment and the free flow of
ideas.
II. THE SOURCE OF THE ACTIONS
The philosophers of the Enlightenment Period of the Eighteenth
Century created an awareness that we own ourselves and our labor, and that
we are our most significant property.3 These principles were a mainstay
in the founding of our Republic and found direct expression in the
Declaration of Independence, which states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness.'
These sentiments found legal expression in an historic article written
over one hundred years ago by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, in
which they argued for legal recognition of the right of privacy.5 Although
the article focused on the right to be free from public disclosure of private
facts, it was described as "part of the more general right to the immunity
of the person,-the right to one's personality."6 Stated succinctly, they
described this fundamental right as "the right to be let alone."' This liberty
encompassed a broad array of personal rights, including the right to be free
from defamation, a tort that had existed for some time. and had by then
been codified as a statutory cause of action in most states.8
3. See DAVM HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 15-33 (1777).
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
6. ILd. at 207.
7. lit at 193.
8. See CAL. Cev. CODE §§ 44-48.9 (,Vest 1993) (originally enacted in 1872).
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Seventy years later, William Prosser argued that the right to privacy
had become splintered into four separate actions:9
(1) Invasion of privacy, which requires some intrusion, generally
physical, into the personal privacy of the plaintiff. Because this cause of
action does not require publication, it is not discussed in this article;
(2) Public disclosure of private facts, which requires publication
of private facts regarding the plaintiff;
(3) False light in the public eye, which requires a publication that
imputes or implies some objectionable falsehood regarding the plaintiff; and
(4) Appropriation, which requires the appropriation, for the
defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiff's name, image, voice, or
likeness (collectively referred to herein as "persona"). This cause of action
came to be known as the right of publicity.
Prosser's formulation was accepted by the courts, and the law
developed independently for each cause of action as well as for defamation,
causing differences and anomalies between them.
The right of publicity, in particular, took its own turn whefi some
states, including New York and California, enacted statutory recognition of
the right.' ° In addition, courts have not been consistent in their general
approach to dealing with these statutes. In some cases, the courts read the
statutes in a mechanical manner and reached conclusions that were
diametrically opposed to the conclusions reached under the common law in
the same opinion.
For example, in California, where the statute is non-exclusive, the
Ninth Circuit has held that an imitation of someone's persona is not
actionable under the governing statute even though it is actionable under
common law." Other courts, however, have interpreted the governing
statute more broadly to include imitations.' It is submitted that when the
statute is non-exclusive, the latter approach is the correct one; the statutory
provisions should, to the maximum extent possible, be interpreted to
correspond with the common law in order to create a uniform, predictable
body of law. For example, any defense that applies to the common law
9. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1993) (non-exclusive; coexistent with common
law); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Consol. 1993).
11. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL
2443 (1993) (robot in evening gown spinning the "Wvheel of Fortune"); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (imitation of voice).
12. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (phrase "portrait or picture"
in the New York statute interpreted to include representations recognizable as a likeness of the
plaintiff, including cartoon drawings).
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cause of action should apply to the statutory cause of action, and any
defense that applies to the statutory cause of action should apply to the
common law cause of action.
In addition to the common law and statutory sources, the California
Constitution was amended in 1972 to expressly refer to a right to priva-
cy,13 and this provision has been held to be a separate source for permit-
ting a civil cause of action.
14
II. THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE ACIONS
For each publication-based tort action, the harm to the plaintiff is a
personal one based on a violation of the "right to be let alone." It is
irrelevant that this personal injury can be stated in different ways depending
on the facts (e.g., harm to reputation or harm to emotions). It is no more
relevant that a punch to the face may cause the nose to bleed, and a punch
to the stomach may cause one to buckle over; both are physical injuries
caused by the same tort-battery. This personal nature of the harm applies
even to an action based on appropriation. Since this action came to be
known as the right of publicity, some courts phrase the right as the
exclusive right to exploit one's persona and to prevent others from doing
so without payment. This formulation puts a demonstrably commercial
spin on the right and implicates economic, not personal, injury. This
commercial formulation, however, overlooks the ultimate source of the
right, which is the personal "right to be let alone." For this reason the
right of publicity is not limited to celebrities or public figures but applies
to private citizens as well. 5 Even in the classic case of a celebrity
bringing an action for the commercial use of his or her persona, the facts
frequently state that the dispute is not for lack of payment; rather, the
celebrity is offended by any commercial use of his or her persona.
6
13. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I.
14. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825 (1976).
15. Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993); Maheu v. CBS, 201 Cal.
App. 3d 662 (1988) (assumed without discussion); Stilson v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 28 Cal. App.
3d 270 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 952 (1973) (listing sweepstake finalists without permission);
Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82 (1955) (a private citizen has
a cause of action if they are listed, without consent, as endorsing a particular product). But see
Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984) (incorrectly concluding that the right
applies only to celebrities).
16. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993).
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Since the publication-based tort actions are based on personal, rather
than economic harm, the actions should be confined to individuals;
corporations and other entities do not suffer the type of personal harm the
actions were meant to remedy. In addition, there is already a well-defined
body of law-trademark law, unfair competition, and trade disparage-
ment--designed to protect corporations and other entities from the improper
use of their corporate personae. Because the publication-based tort actions
remedy a personal harm to the plaintiff, the actions die with the plaintiff
under the common law."' Some states, however, have extended the right
of publicity to heirs by statute, again reflecting incorrectly a commercial
formulation of that right."8
IV. THE UNIFIED NATURE OF THE ACrIONS
The inordinate amount of confusion surrounding the scope of the
separate publication-based tort actions, and the differences between them,
stems from the fact that they are different paths to the same goal and
represent different ways to state the same elements of the same cause of
action. If the four publication-based tort actions are summarized by their
common elements, they become one cause of action triggered by an
offensive publication regarding the plaintiff.
A. Offensive
One requirement of all the publication-based tort actions is that the
publication regarding the plaintiff be offensive to a reasonable person. This
requirement is the essence of defamation, 9 and it is expressly stated as an
element of the action based on public disclosure of private facts20 and of
the action based on portraying plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."
17. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813 (1979) (right of publicity); Kelly v. Johnson
Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718 (1958) (defamation).
18. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 990 (West 1993).
19. CAL. Civ. CODE § 45 (West 1993); Patton v. Royal Indus., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760 (1968);
Megarry v. Norton, 137 Cal. App. 2d 581 (1955).
20. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224 (1953).
21. Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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1. Presumed If Commercial Use
For right of publicity cases, as with false light cases, it is the context,
not the text, of the publication that is deemed to be offensive. For
example, a false light case might involve the placement of an innocent
plaintiff's photograph within an article on drug dealers, with no express
statement that the plaintiff is a drug dealer. The offensive element is
supplied by the context, not the text, of the publication, as it creates an
implied association that is offensive to a reasonable person. Similarly, the
unauthorized use of someone's persona for a commercial use creates an
implied association that should be presumed offensive.
In applying this presumption, the definition of "commercial use"
could be taken, by analogy, from California's statutory codification of the
right of publicity, which applies to any use of someone's persona "on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling,
or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services."'
In order for the definition of "products, merchandise, and goods" not to
become limitless, the definition must, contrary to current case law,
exclude newspapers, magazines, and television news (collectively referred
to here as "News Sources"), although books, movies, television shows,
posters, and the like should be included. This article will refer to any
commercial use as described above (excluding News Sources) as a
"Commercial Use."
2. Rebutting the Presumption
Although a Commercial Use should raise a presumption of offensive-
ness, it is rebutted based on the facts and circumstances. For example, it
is common in the entertainment industry for companies to run advertise-
ments congratulating celebrities on awards or achievements. In these cases,
the presumption of offensiveness should be rebutted even if there is an
express or implied association to the celebrity. Similarly, a book or movie
may make reference to a person in a neutral or laudatory fashion, without
the intention or appearance of any implied association, so the presumption
of offensiveness should be rebutted.24
22. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3344(a) (West 1993).
23. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983) (the National Enquirer was a
"product, merchandise, or good" within the statute).
24. This should have been, but was not, the reason the defendant prevailed in Dora v.
Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993) (surfing documentary).
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The presumption is rebutted by mere incidental use of plaintiff's
persona. For example, a twenty-seven second "clip" of the plaintiff's
singing performance and a single mention of his name in a movie was held
not actionable because it was an incidental use.' Similarly, a brief
discussion of a plaintiff in a book is not actionable. 26  The California
statute recognizing the right of publicity contains its own incidental use
concept, which permits the use of any photograph or videotape of a person
as part of a "definable group," including, without limitation, a crowd,
audience, club, or team, as long as the individual has not been singled out
in any manner.27 This is a useful application of the incidental use concept
and should be incorporated by case law into common law, just as the
common law incidental use concept has been incorporated by case law into
the statute78
Although the incidental use concept should be interpreted broadly,
a defendant should not be able to create an incidental use simply by
engaging in multiple uses that separately would not be incidental uses. For
example, the face of a baseball player on a baseball card should not be an
incidental use merely because there are a large number of cards.
The presumption of offensiveness also is rebutted when there is no
actual use or imitation of plaintiff's persona, since the implied association
is too tenuous. This basis for rebutting the presumption of offensiveness
is analogous to the idea/expression doctrine developed under the Copyright
Act. Under this doctrine, the Copyright Act prevents the unauthorized use
of the expression of an idea, but it does not prevent unauthorized use of the
idea itself.29 This doctrine is essential to protecting the free flow of ideas,
which is an essential element of the fabric of our society and a necessary
concomitant to developing and improving prior ideas.
To date, the right of publicity cases have permitted liability based on
any indirect invocation of plaintiff's persona.30 Application of the idea/
25. Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1992). See also
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) ("[Ulse of plaintiff's
photograph was merely incidental advertising of defendants' magazine in which plaintiff had
earlier been properly and fairly depicted"), aff'd without opinion, 352 N.E.2d 584 (1976).
26. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880 (1974).
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(b) (West 1993).
28. Johnson, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 880.
29. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
30. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) cert denied, 113 S. CL 2443
(1993) (advertisement with robot in evening gown spinning the "Wheel of Fortune" was
actionable); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Carson's identity may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not
used"); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (use of
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expression doctrine would protect any Commercial Use that did not involve
the actual use or imitation of someone's persona. A drawing showing the
features of the plaintiff would be actionable, even if highly stylized. On
the other hand, the mere fact that the plaintiff's persona is called to mind
by reason of association would not be actionable. For example, any
reference to the film Terminator II is likely to automatically call to mind
Arnold Schwarzenegger, but such an indirect association should not be
actionable. Were the rule otherwise, the free flow of ideas would be
ground to a halt by those whose personas have any association to the ideas.
The most egregious case to date is the decision that Samsung
Electronics violated Vanna White's right of publicity by an advertisement
showing a robot in an evening gown spinning the "Wheel of Fortune."32
Other than the evening gown, which is not an element of persona, the robot
bore no resemblance to Vanna White. Thus, only the "idea" of Vanna
White had been used. Since any reference to the show, "Wheel of
Fortune," will almost always call to mind Vanna White, the court
effectively granted her the exclusive right to any commercial reference to
the show. Similarly, another case held that an advertiser violated a race car
driver's right of publicity by using a highly modified photograph of his
racing car in a cigarette advertisement.33 Neither the driver nor his name
could be seen, so this use should not have been actionable. Still another
case held that the manufacturer of "Here's Johnny" portable toilets violated
Johnny Carson's right of publicity.' While the phrase, "Here's Johnny,"
certainly calls to mind Johnny Carson, it is because of his famous
introduction, not his name. For example, a portable toilet simply called
"Johnny" would probably not invoke the association to Johnny Carson to
the average person. Thus, it is idea association from his introduction, not
the use of his name, that invokes the association to Johnny Carson.35 In
each of these cases, because of the tenuous link to the plaintiff, the public
probably did not think that there was any actual association between the
plaintiff and the product, so the presumption of offensiveness should have
been rebutted.
highly modified photograph of plaintiff's race car was actionable).
31. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (cartoon drawing of
Muhammad Ali).
32. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
33. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Carson, 698 F.2d at 831.
35. ld. at 837.
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B. Publication
Each publication-based tort action requires some oral, written, or
pictorial publication targeted to one or more persons (other than the
plaintiff).36  The case law under the publication-based privacy actions,
however, has added the requirement that the publication be "public,
37
defined as publication to "a large number of persons. 38 This requirement
appears plainly incorrect; while the number of persons receiving the
information may be relevant to determining damages, the publication should
be no less actionable simply because it was made to a small group or even
one person. There still exists personal harm from both that disclosure and
the risk of further dissemination. No one wants their personal "dirty
laundry" aired before "only" their employer, so the integrated publication-
based tort actions should not require a publication to be "public."
C. Regarding the Plaintiff
A reasonable person must understand that the publication refers to
the plaintiff.39 For example, a photograph or drawing of someone, without
mention of their name, should not be actionable if a reasonable person
could not recognize the individual from the photograph or drawing because
of the pose, focus, or size.
V. DEFENSES
This section discusses the uniform defenses that should apply to the
publication-based tort actions.
36. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979)
(publication to one person is enough for defamation).
37. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 214 Cal. App. 3d 646, 660 (1989); Porten
v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828 (1976).
38. Porten, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 828 (disclosure of transcript to Scholarship and Loan
Commission was not sufficient).
39. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 78 (citing the test from Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969)).
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A. First Amendment
The First Amendment, if applicable to the facts, affords an absolute
defense to the publication-based tort actions. Although publication-based
tort actions often involve commercial speech, even commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment, albeit at a lesser level than other types
of expression. The Supreme Court has stated: "[L]aws restricting
commercial speech, unlike laws burdening other forms of protected
expression, need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a
substantial state interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny."'
An example of a substantial state interest is the prevention of fraud or
deception.4' Thus, if the publication meets the requirements for protection
under the First Amendment, it should not receive less protection simply
because the publication is commercial speech unless it is fraudulent or
deceptive.
1. Matters of Public Interest
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment provides an
absolute defense to publication-based tort actions for reports on matters of
public interest, unless the reports contain a knowing or reckless, as opposed
to merely negligent, falsehood.42 This protection applies to a broad range
of expression in both News Sources and Commercial Uses, including
magazine articles,43 books,' and movies.4  Advertisements, however,
generally do not report on matters of public interest, so they rarely qualify
for this defense. This is not a per se rule, however, and some advertise-
ments may qualify for protection. Because the public interest defense does
not apply to a knowing or reckless falsehood, it would generally not apply
to false-light cases, which are premised on implied falsehood.
In order to provide broad First Amendment protection, the definition
of "public interest" sweeps up any report regarding public figures and
40. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993) (citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) (public disclosure of private facts).
43. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 374.
44. Maheu v. CBS, 201 Cal. App. 3d 662 (1988).
45. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
25 Cal. 3d 860 (1979).
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celebrities, 46 as well as reports regarding private citizens who become
associated with some issue that has caught the public eye.47 In determin-
ing what matters are of "public interest," there should be a presumption that
a matter is of public interest if it appears in a News Source, although this
presumption is rebuttable.48 For example, the public interest defense has
been used to protect a magazine photograph of a couple in a romantic pose
as entertainment, 9 and the opinion can be explained on the basis of this
presumption. No presumption, and indeed no public interest defense,
should apply to the Commercial Use of photographs with no accompanying
text or discussion, such as a poster, postcard, picture book, or advertise-
ment, no matter how interested the public is in the photographs.
The statutory provisions recognizing the right of publicity provide a
similar defense for use of one's persona in connection with any "news,
50
which has been interpreted to be at least as broad as, if not broader than,
the First Amendment protection for reports on matters of public interest."
The definition of "news" within the statute has been interpreted in a similar
manner to the First Amendment defense by excluding reports that were
knowingly or recklessly false. 2
There are limitations, however, on the First Amendment defense for
reports on matters of public interest. The Supreme Court has held that an
unauthorized television news broadcast of an entire human cannonball act
was not protected, because it caused a "substantial threat to the economic
value of that performance."' This holding was based on the commercial
formulation of the right of publicity as implicating an economic harm, and
the decision should be limited to its facts (i.e., the unauthorized broadcast
of an entire act).
46. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
47. Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993) (photograph of well-known
person, with plaintiff at her side, at psychiatric hospital); Dora v. Frontline Video, 15 Cal. App.
4th 536 (1993) (documentary on surfers); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (article about
crime victims).
48. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a cartoon in a
magazine was not "news" because the cartoon itself had no "newsworthy dimension").
49. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224 (1953).
50. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1993).
51. New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Publications, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); Dora v.
Frontline Video, 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993); Maheu v. CBS, 201 Cal. App. 3d 662 (1988);
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983).
52. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 409.
53. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977).
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2. Parodies
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,'4 the Supreme Court held that a
parody, even a highly offensive one, of a public figure is protected by the
First Amendment, except in the unusual case where a reasonable person
would believe that the parody expresses a statement of fact, and the fact is
untrue." Although the Hustler decision dealt with an action for intention-
al infliction of emotional distress, the result would have to be the same
under the publicity-based tort actions, or the decision would be toothless.
In order to be protected, the parody should relate directly to the plaintiff;
it should not be enough that the plaintiff's persona is used in connection
with a parody of something other than the plaintiff, or the defense would
become too broad.
In White v. Samsung Electronics America,6 the Ninth Circuit held
that the First Amendment parody defense did not apply to commercial
advertisements." This decision is plainly wrong. As discussed above,
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, at least in the
absence of fraud or deception, so the First Amendment parody defense
should have protected the advertisement in question.
B. Express or Implied Consent
Another defense to the publication-based tort actions arises if the
plaintiff gives express or implied consent to the publication."8 Express
consent is straightforward, but implied consent should be interpreted
broadly, based on the expectations of a reasonable person in those
circumstances. For example, actors in a movie should be held to implicitly
consent to use of their personas in advertisements for the movie, just as
those who pose for a picture should be held to implicitly consent to an
intended use of the picture that they were aware of at the time. Similarly,
those who become advisory or honorary members of a board of directors
of a charitable organization should be held to implicitly consent to a listing
of their name and capacity in an advertisement by the charitable organiza-
tion. In addition, athletes in a game that they know is being televised
should be held to implicitly consent to the televised broadcast and any
54. 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (highly offensive parody of religious leader).
55. Id. at 56.
56. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. Id. at 1401.
58. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20 (1969).
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subsequent broadcasts, outtakes, etc., that are within the reasonable
contemplation of the athletes at the outset.
C. Truthful Publication of Public Facts or Opinion
Courts have held that the publication based privacy actions will not
lie if the facts were already disclosed; this includes the publication of
photographs of the plaintiff taken in public. 9 For defamation actions, this
defense is stated in terms of "truth is a defense," but if the truth relates to
private facts, the publication becomes actionable as a public disclosure of
private facts. Thus, when the publication-based tort actions are integrated,
the defense is based on truthful publication of public facts. This "truth"
defense would not apply to any publication that creates a false implied
association, such as an action based on false-light or any Commercial Use
(unless the presumption of offensiveness is rebutted, in which case defenses
are irrelevant).
Another aspect of the "truth" defense is the broad protection afforded
the statement of opinions (as long as they do not state or imply some false
or private fact), because opinions reflect the "truth" about the beliefs and
views of the speaker. 6° If, however, the opinion goes beyond a truthful
expression of the views of the speaker and expresses or implies a false or
private fact, then it is not protected under this defense.
6'
D. Privileged
A defense to defamation exists if the publication is legally privileged,
as when it occurs in the context of a legislative, judicial, or administrative
proceeding.62 This defense should apply uniformly to all the publication-
based tort actions.
59. Dora v. Frontline Video, 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993) (applying this defense to a right of
publicity claim by a surfer who appeared in a surfing documentary); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
40 Cal. 2d 224 (1953).
60. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260 (1986).
61. Id at 266.
62. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 47 (West 1993).
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VI. NON-DEFENSES
Some defendants have argued for, and some cases have applied,
improper defenses to the publication-based tort actions. This section
analyzes these purported defenses and demonstrates why they should not
be applicable.
A. Copyright Act Preemption
In a plainly erroneous decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Copyright Act preempted a right of publicity claim by baseball players
objecting to televised broadcasts of their games.63 In reaching its decision,
the court held that the players were the authors of the televised games
within the meaning of the Copyright Act. However, a better view is that
the author of a televised game is the production company that films the
game."4 The players were not the authors of the work; rather, they were
the subject of the work.
The Copyright Act protects authors and owners of a work, while
publication-based tort actions protect the subjects of a work. The Copyright
Act and the publication-based tort actions protect entirely different interests.
Therefore, Copyright Act preemption does not apply. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the unauthorized broadcast of an entire
cannonball act was a violation of the right of publicity, even though the
broadcaster undoubtedly owned the copyright in the broadcast.65 Similar-
ly, some courts have held that plaintiffs are not preempted by the Copyright
Act from objecting to the imitation of their voice in a song on a commer-
cial, even if the defendant has the valid right to use the words and music
to the song under the Copyright Act.' Therefore, Copyright Act preemp-
tion should not have been a defense to the baseball players' cause of action;
however, the case should have been decided the same way based on
implied consent.6'
63. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
65. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
66. Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
67. See supra part V.B.
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B. Disclaimers
It is common for commercials to imitate celebrity voices, usually in
a jocular fashion, and then to end with the disclaimer, "celebrity voices
impersonated." If such disclaimers were allowed as a defense, then the
publication-based tort actions would be eviscerated. For example, an
advertiser could use a perfect imitation of the plaintiff's voice in a song on
a non-humorous commercial, and would rely on a disclaimer as a defense.
This cannot be allowed. On the other hand, these disclaimers are typically
used in connection with commercials that are parodies where it is obvious
that it is not the real celebrity speaking. In these cases, the commercials
should qualify under the First Amendment parody defense.68
C. Fair Use
It is also tempting to suggest a fair use defense based on analogy to
copyright law or trademark law. 69 Both copyright law and trademark law,
however, are based on the commercial concept of encouraging maximum
effort for the overall good of society. Furthermore, they both address
economic, not personal, injury. Since the publication-based tort actions
address personal injury, the fair use analogy is not a good one. The
concerns addressed by a fair use defense, however, are addressed by the
elements of a prima facie case and the defenses set forth in this article,
which should provide adequate breathing room for the free marketplace of
ideas.
VII. EXAMPLES
It is useful to test the approach suggested in this article against real-
world examples to see if the results are logical, predictable, and fair. The
examples discussed below are all true, and the names, when used, have not
been changed to protect the innocent. Many of the examples are based on
the author's observation; others are based on case law. Most of the
examples focus on Commercial Use, the breeding ground for most of the
recent cases. Keep in mind that every Commercial Use creates (1) a
presumption of offensiveness, (2) the inability to rely on a presumption of
public interest, and (3) the inability to rely on the defense of truthful
68. See supra part V.A.2.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1988) (trademark).
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publication of public facts (unless the presumption of offensiveness is
rebutted, in which case defenses are irrelevant). The reader may want to
decide how he or she would rule before reading the author's conclusion in
each subsequent paragraph. In each case, the use is without the express
consent of the plaintiff.
1. A picture of Al Unser appears on the cover of TWA Ambassador
Magazine (an in-flight magazine) and his photographs accompany an auto-
racing article in the magazine.
Because the photographs are used in connection with what is
essentially a long advertisement for TWA as opposed to a normal
magazine, it may be appropriate to treat the publication as a Commercial
Use, not a News Source. However, even though the magazine may be
Commercial Use, it nonetheless reports on a matter of public interest, auto
racing, and Al Unser's photographs relate to that report, even the cover
shot. Thus, the use should be protected under the First Amendment as
related to a report on matters of public interest.
2. A picture of a one million dollars sweepstake winner appears in
a newspaper with a simple caption that reads, "$1 million sweepstake
winner receives check."
This non-Commercial Use does not meet the element of offensive-
ness, and in any event it should be protected under the First Amendment
as a report on a matter of public interest by applying the rebuttable
presumption of public interest suggested in this article for matters that
appear in a News Source. If the picture were taken in public, the
newspaper could also rely on the defense of truthful publication of public
facts.
3. The same picture and caption appear in an advertisement by the
company sponsoring the sweepstake.
This is a closer call. The photograph is now being used in connec-
tion with a Commercial Use, but it may be possible to rebut the presump-
tion of offensiveness on these facts if the purpose is to congratulate the
winner. The company could also attempt to defend the advertisement as a
report on a matter of public interest, but if no News Source has reported on
the sweepstake or its winner, this would be difficult. On the other hand,
if a News Source has reported on the contest, then it should be protected
as a report on a matter of public interest. Depending on the facts, the
winner may also have implicitly consented to the use.
4. A picture of a couple on a beach, with the couple's features
recognizable, appears in a travel advertisement.
This Commercial Use should be actionable, and no defense should
apply.
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5. A movie advertisement displays a photograph of its cast.
Although this is a Commercial Use, this is the most obvious
application of the defense of implied consent.
6. A photograph of musicians appears in an advertisement for a
radio station that plays their style of music.
This Commercial Use should be actionable, and no defense, including
implied consent, should apply.
7. A billboard for Orkin Exterminators states: "Orkin: The
Exterminator," with an image of what looks like a robot from the film
Terminator II, but the facial features do not resemble anyone in the movie.
The presumption of offensiveness from this Commercial Use should
be rebutted on these facts under the idea/expression doctrine because the
robot does not resemble any of the actors in the film. If the robot had the
obvious facial features of one of the actors, it should be actionable. It is
also tempting to rely on the parody defense; however, the humor relates to
the twist on the title of the film, not to the actors.
8. A movie advertisement quotes a rave review by Siskel & Ebert.
Since all critics know that this is a common practice, this Com-
mercial Use should be protected by the defense of implied consent.
9. A restaurant decorates its walls with celebrity photographs.
There should be no defense to this Commercial Use, whether or not
the celebrities have been to the restaurant. Consent should not be implied
simply from dining there (unless the celebrities made their photographs
available for this purpose). In addition, this is an example where multiple
uses should not be treated as an incidental use of each one, so the
presumption of offensiveness would not be rebutted.
10. A board game, "Faces," requires matching celebrities' pictures
to their names.
No defense should apply to this Commercial Use. This is another
example where multiple uses should not be treated as an incidental use of
each one.
11. A book titled "Fame" features Madonna on the cover.
This Commercial Use should be protected under the First Amend-
ment defense for reports on matters of public interest if there is some
discussion of Madonna in the book.
12. A book contains only photographs and names of one or more
celebrities, with no accompanying text.
This Commercial Use should not be protected as a report on matters
of public interest because there is no textual discussion. The same pictures
appearing in a News Source would be protected based on the presumption
of public interest.
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13. A board game is based upon baseball players' career statistics.
This Commercial Use should be protected as an incidental use
because the career statistics are in the public domain, and it is impossible
to discuss the statistics without mentioning the players. The public simply
would not think that there is any actual association between the players and
the game.
14. A picture of a couple kissing on a Paris street is made into a
poster.
If the couple is not recognizable by a reasonable person, the element
requiring a publication "regarding the plaintiff" would not be met, so there
would be no prima facie cause of action. If the couple was recognizable,
this Commercial Use would be actionable.
15. A company publishes a public domain book with the author's
name and picture on the cover.
The use of the author's name in connection with this Commercial
Use should be protected as an incidental use in connection with publication
of the book, thus rebutting the presumption of offensiveness. However, use
of the photograph goes beyond an incidental use and should be actionable.
16. Sting's picture appears in an advertisement for a concert hall
where he performed.
No defense should apply to this Commercial Use, as merely
appearing at a concert hall should not create implied consent to use of the
person's photograph in advertisements.
17. A newspaper publishes a Doonesbury cartoon ridiculing Ross
Perot.
Although offensive in fact, this use should be protected under the
First Amendment parody defense.
18. A theater organization publishes an advertisement stating,
"Thank you, Arnold Schwarzenegger," with his picture, to congratulate him
for the success of a movie in which he appeared.
Although this is a Commercial Use, the presumption of offensiveness
should be rebutted on these facts, because the purpose of the advertisement
is to congratulate, not advertise.
19. An actor who looks very similar to a celebrity appears in an
advertisement.
As long as a reasonable person would not think that the actor is, in
fact, the celebrity, the presumption of offensiveness should be rebutted for
this Commercial Use based on the idea/expression doctrine. The public
would not think that there is any association between the celebrity and the
advertisement. The use may also qualify for the First Amendment parody
defense if there is humor directed at the celebrity.
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20. Wok Fast restaurant publishes a billboard advertising their fast
food, with a portrait of Darryl Gates, the former Los Angeles Chief of
Police who would not leave office despite public pressure, with the caption
"[F]or when you can't leave the office, or won't."
This is a good example of a Commercial Use that should be
protected by the First Amendment parody defense.
21. Samsung Electronics publishes a commercial depicting a robot
in an evening gown spinning the "Wheel of Fortune."70
The presumption of offensiveness should be rebutted for this
Commercial Use based on the idea/expression doctrine. Even if the prima
facie case were met, this use should be protected under the First Amend-
ment parody defense."
22. Playgirl publishes an unflattering cartoon of Muhammad Ali.72
Although offensive in fact, this use should be protected by the First
Amendment parody defense.
23. An advertisement uses an imitation of a celebrity's voice on a
song in a commercial.'
If a reasonable person would recognize the voice as the plaintiff's,
then this Commercial Use meets the "regarding the plaintiff" element, and
no defense should apply.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the publication-based tort actions are all rooted in the
same fundamental "right to be let alone" and should all be integrated into
one cause of action based on an offensive publication regarding the
plaintiff. In defining the scope of this single cause of action, the same
elements of the prima facie case and the same defenses should apply. In
addition, any statutory expressions of the actions, such as the statutory
recognition of defamation and the right of publicity, should be interpreted
consistently with this unified cause of action. The current divergence in the
judicial approaches to each publication-based tort action, as well as to the
statutory actions, provides plaintiffs with too formidable an array of
70. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).
71. This is the same conclusion as was reached by Judge Alarcon in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in White. Id. at 1407.
72. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding liability).
73. Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993)
(finding liability); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding liability).
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weapons to attack any single publication. If the elements and defenses are
porous and are not applied consistently, and they are not, as attested to by
the slew of unwarranted plaintiff victories in right of publicity cases, then
our robust free marketplace of ideas will leak through the pores, and we
will all suffer for it.
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